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Abstract—IaaS clouds invest substantial capital in operating
their data centers. Reducing the cost of resource provisioning,
is their forever pursuing goal. Computing resource trading
among multiple IaaS clouds provide a potential for IaaS clouds
to utilize cheaper resources to fulfill their jobs, by exploiting
the diversities of different clouds’ workloads and operational
costs. In this paper, we focus on studying the IaaS clouds’ cost
reduction through computing resource trading among multiple
IaaS clouds. We formulate the global cost minimization problem
among multiple IaaS clouds under cooperative scenario where
each individual cloud’s workload and cost information is known.
Taking into consideration jobs with disparate lengths, a non-
preemptive approximation algorithm for leftover job migration
and new job scheduling is designed. Given to the selfishness of
individual clouds, we further design a randomized double auction
mechanism to elicit clouds’ truthful bidding for buying or selling
virtual machines. We evaluate our algorithms using trace-driven
simulations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing is emerging as a new paradigm that
offers users on-demand access to computing resources with
small management overhead. As a basic model for delivering
cloud services, Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) has been
adopted for serving the ever-growing demand of computing,
as exemplified by Amazon EC2 [1], Windows Azure [2],
Google Compute Engine [3], Datapipe [4] and HP Cloud [5].
Such IaaS clouds run data centers with a “sea” of computing
servers, and face a significant challenge of minimizing the
operational cost incurred, while satisfying job requests from
users [6] [7]. Extensive research has been devoted to reducing
the power cost in data centers [6], [8], often with a focus
on algorithm design that helps a single cloud provider with
cost minimization, through strategies such as CPU speed
scaling, dynamic server capacity provisioning, or exploiting
the temporal and geographical diversities in power cost in a
single cloud’s geo-distributed data centers.
Such diversities are actually more evident and pronounced
across different IaaS clouds, given the typically limited geo-
graphic span of a single cloud. Both workload and resource
cost of a cloud vary with time, and such variation curves often
complement each other across different clouds distributed in
distinct geographical areas, manifesting opportunities for inter-
cloud job scheduling and migration that enable significant
savings in operational cost. However, such opportunities can-
not materialize without the help of (i) a judicious scheduling
algorithm that computes the optimal scheduling decisions,
and (ii) an effective market mechanism that elicits desirable
behaviors from individual clouds with their own economic
interests, for such decisions to be implemented.
Users of IaaS clouds are actually already exploiting such
diversities among different IaaS clouds to reduce their cost.
For example, the cloud management platform RightScale [9]
enables its users to efficiently, automatically provide and
operate their resources across different IaaS clouds through
a configuration framework, the ServerTemplate. Showing the
practical feasibility of deploying computing jobs and resources
across IaaS clouds, such realworld applications indeed pre-
ceded and motivated our theoretical investigation in this work.
We first model a global time-averaged cost minimization
problem for a federation of multiple IaaS clouds under the
cooperative scenario, where the solution space includes strate-
gies for scheduling newly arriving jobs and migrating existing
jobs. A one-shot optimization problem is derived based on the
Lyapunov optimization framework, with an individual cloud’s
job queue backlogs representing its workload information, and
the virtual machine (VM) and network cost for completing
jobs as the operational cost. The one-shot optimization is a
non-linear integer programming problem in general. However,
practical solutions often prefer to place all VM instances of a
single job in the same cloud, leading to a linear integer pro-
gram instead. We design an approximation algorithm for the
one-shot optimization for this practical scenario, guaranteeing
a solution that is within a constant gap C from the optimum
to the original non-linear integer problem. By running this
approximation algorithm in each time slot, we can guarantee
that the time-averaged system-wide cost approaches the long-
term offline optimum asymptotically.
Real-world clouds are autonomous entities with their own
economic interests, and the workload information in terms of
job queue backlogs and realtime operational cost are private.
A truthful market mechanism is needed, for eliciting truthful
reports on such information from them, e.g., through buy-
bids and sell-bids for VM instances in an auction. We design
a randomized double auction mechanism that is truthful in
expectation. The winner determination problem (WDP) of the
double auction under truthfully bidding is equivalent to the
one-shot optimization problem in the cooperative scenario.
Our cooperative approximation algorithm can compute a so-
lution to the WDP that both (a) guarantees an approximation
ratio of 11−δ , and (b) verifies the integrality gap between
the WDP integer program (IP) and its linear programming
relaxation (LPR) with the same upper-bound 11−δ .
Our double auction mechanism operates in each time slot
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Grove (VCG) auction with the LPR of the WDP as the
social welfare maximization problem, and compute an optimal
fractional VM allocation together with fractional VCG charges
and payments. Second, we apply a primal-dual decomposition
technique for packing-type optimization problems due to Carr
et al. [10] and Lavi et al. [11] for decomposing the fractional
optimal allocation, scaled down by 1 − δ, into a weighted
combination of integral allocations. Third, we randomly pick
each integral solution in the combination with probability
equaling its weight. Finally, we scale down the fractional VCG
charges and payments by 1−δ to be the charges and payments
expectation of our randomized double auction. We show that
the resulting auction is not only truthful in expectation, but
simultaneously achieves the same approximation ratio 11−δ to
the WDP, and therefore can be applied as a cloud market
mechanism for solving the one-shot optimization for achieving
time-averaged long-term minimum system cost.
The fact that our randomized auction essentially guarantees
the same approximation ratio to the WDP as the cooperative
approximation algorithm does is somewhat notable. The coop-
erative algorithm can assume truthful bids for free and focus
on algorithmically optimizing the WDP objective, while our
auction has to pay close attention to truthfulness in both sell-
bids and buy-bids. Indeed, most existing truthful auctions that
are based on approximate social welfare maximization result
in an extra factor loss in social welfare. To our knowledge,
this work represents the first double auction that is truthful
in both sides, and matches the cooperative social welfare
approximation ratio without loss.
In the rest of the paper, Sec. II reviews related literature.
Sec. III presents system model. Sec. IV derives the one-
shot minimization problem. Sec. V designs an approximation
algorithm for the one-shot optimization. Sec. VI presents the
randomized double auction. Sec. VII presents our simulation
results, and Sec. VIII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
The cost minimization problem has been a focus of studies
in the cloud computing literature due to its economic impor-
tance [8][6][12][13]. These studies often focus on a single
cloud with geographically distributed data centers. Qureshi et
al. [6] develop an electricity price aware workload routing
method for reducing the electric bill. Rao et al. [12] formulate
an electricity cost minimization problem as a constrained
mixed-integer programming problem under the temporal and
spatial diversities of electricity prices. Liu et al. [13] take both
delay cost and electricity cost into consideration for workload
routing and processing in a cloud’s distributed data centers.
Yao et al. [8] use a two-time-scale framework for integrating
decisions on CPU speed scaling, server right-sizing and inter-
data center workload routing among a cloud’s distributed data
centers, for cost reduction. This work instead pursues provable
long-term cost reduction in a cloud federation through a
randomized double auction mechanism.
For resource trading among multiple clouds, Mihailescu
et al. [14], [15] discuss the advantages of dynamic pricing
in resource trading among a cloud federation. Although the
economical and computational advantages of dynamic pricing
are illustrated, they are not enabled by a practical market
mechanism such as a truthful auction. Li et al. [16] study
the resource trading among multiple IaaS clouds and design
a double auction mechanism. Different from this work, they
focus on the revenue an individual cloud can glean from the
auction, instead of system-wide cost savings.
Lavi et al. [11] propose a single-sided randomized auction
developed upon a primal-dual LP decomposition technique due
to Carr et.al. [10], for combinatorial optimization problems
with an underlying packing structure. Such single-sided ran-
domized auctions have been applied in the secondary spectrum
market [17] [18], for efficient channel allocation. To the
authors’ knowledge, this work is the first that generalizes
such a randomized, truthful auction framework into the double
auction paradigm.
III. MODEL AND NOTATION
A. System Model
We consider a number J of federated IaaS clouds that run in
a time slotted manner. We assume that the IaaS clouds support
interoperability through standardizations such as the Open
Virtualization Format (OVF) [19], Open Cloud Computing
Interface (OCCI) [20], such that jobs can be readily migrated
across different IaaS clouds [21]. Job scheduling and migration
decisions are made and executed at the beginning of each
time slot t ∈ [0, T ]. We assume that each cloud provider
j ∈ [1, J ] operates a single data center for ease of presentation;
our techniques and results can be generalized to clouds with
multiple data centers in a straightforward way.
Each cloud j has Nj homogeneous servers that each can
provide Hj VM instances. The cost of providing one VM
instance at time slot t in cloud j is βj(t). Clouds are connected
through network links leased from Internet Service Providers
(ISPs). The cost for transferring a unit data out of cloud i to
cloud j is λi, which is dependent on the source cloud only,
as is the case in real-world clouds such as Amazon EC2 [22]
and Windows Azure [23].
Each IaaS cloud receives jobs from its customers. A job is
specified by a pair (gk, wk), where gk is the number of VMs
requested, and wk ∈ [wmin, wmax] is the number of time slots
that these VMs are needed for. Let K be the total number of
job types. We define the workload of a job as gk · wk . Each
cloud j maintains a queue for unscheduled jobs of type k,
with queue backlog qkj (t), for each k ∈ [1,K].
B. Job Migration & New Job Scheduling
In each time slot, a cloud faces two types of decisions: (1)
for each newly arrived job, whether it should be admitted and
which cloud’s resources should be exploited to execute the job;
(2) for each leftover job from the previous time slot, whether it
should be migrated to another cloud for continuing execution
or not.
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j in t, which may have been executed at different clouds, and
U˜j(t) = |U˜j(t)|. Let Ukj (t) denote the set of type-k jobs of
cloud provider j that are newly scheduled to start execution
in t (and can be scheduled to run on different clouds), and
Ukj (t) = |U
k
j (t)|. The actual number of newly scheduled type-
k jobs is U˜kj (t) = min{qkj (t), Ukj (t)}. In the following, we use
U˜j , U
k
j instead of U˜j(t), Ukj (t) when there is no confusion.
VM Placement. A cloud j decides on the leftover job
migration and new job scheduling by computing the placement
of VMs belonging to a job l ∈ ∪KUkj ∪ U˜j . Let the VMs in a
type-k job be numbered from 1 to gk. Each job l of type k is
associated with a gk × gk traffic matrix T l(t), with the entry
T lr,s(t) being the traffic volume from VM r to VM s.
We use a J × 1 vector I ls(t) to denote the placement of job
l’s VM s, s ∈ [1,K], at time slot t, and its i-th entry is
I li,s(t) =
{
1 if job l’s VM s is placed in cloud i at time t;
0 otherwise.
(1)
A J × gk matrix I l = [I l1, . . . , I lgk ] indicates the placement
of all VMs of job l. We use I l(t − 1), l ∈ U˜j to denote the
locations of leftover jobs of cloud j at the beginning of time
slot t. We need to determine the placement of all VMs of a
job l ∈ ∪KUkj ∪ U˜j at time slot t, i.e., I l(t).
Each VM s of job l is placed in exactly one cloud
J∑
i=1
I li,s(t) = 1, ∀l,∀s (2)
Furthermore, VMs placed in the same cloud should not
exceed the capacity of the latter,
∑
j∈J
∑
l∈U˜j
gk∑
s=1
I li,s(t) +
∑
j∈J
∑
l∈∪KU
k
j
gk∑
s=1
I li,s(t) ≤ NiHi, i ∈ [1, J ]
(3)
Job Queue Updating. The federated clouds provide a
common Service Level Objective (SLO) guarantee on service
response time, from when the job arrives to when it starts to
run on VMs. In practice, SLOs can be any specific measurable
characteristics of the Service Level Agreement (SLA), such as
availability, throughput, frequency, response time, or quality.
Here we focus on studying the service response time as the
SLO. This common SLO can be expressed in the standard way
with the Open Cloud Computing Interface [21]:
Each job is either served or dropped (subject to a penalty)
within the maximum response delay d. (4)
Upon violation of the SLO, the cloud provider pays a
penalty αkj and drops the job.1 Let Akj (t) ∈ [0, Amax] (Amax
is an upper bound for one type of job arrivals in each cloud)
and Gkj (t) be the number of type-k jobs cloud j receives from
1In practice, a cloud may never drop a user’s job. The “drop” in our model
can be understood as follows: Each cloud j maintains a set of regular resources
(NiHi VMs) while keeping a set of backup resources, whose provisioning can
be expensive. When a job is “dropped” due to not being scheduled using the
regular resources when its response delay is due, the cloud uses its expensive
backup resources to serve the job, subject to a cost αkj (“the job drop penalty”)
to serve one type-k job.
its customers and drops at time t, respectively. The updates of
the job queues in cloud j are:
qkj (t+ 1) = max{q
k
j (t)− U
k
j (t)−G
k
j (t), 0}+A
k
j (t), k ∈ [1, K].
(5)
Here Ukj (t) =
∑
l∈Uk
j
∑gk
s=1
∑J
i=1 I
l
i,s(t)/g
k and
0 ≤ Gkj (t) ≤ G
k,max
j , k ∈ [1, K], (6)
where Gk,maxj is an upper bound of Gkj (t). We apply the ǫ-persistent service queue technique [24] to guarantee constraint
(4). We associate each job queue qkj with a virtual queue Zkj ,
with initial backlog Zkj (0) = 0, updated by
Zkj (t+ 1) =max
{
Zkj (t) + 1qk
j
(t)>0 · [ǫ
k
j − U
k
j (t)]
−Gkj (t)− 1qk
j
(t)=0 · U
k,max
j , 0
}
, j ∈ [1, J ], k ∈ [1, K].
(7)
Here the indicator function 1qk
j
(t)>0 is 1 when qkj (t) > 0,
and 0 otherwise. Similar for 1qk
j
(t)=0. The virtual queue is built
in such a way to make sure its departure rate equals to that of
the corresponding job queue when the queue backlog of job
queue is larger than 0. A predefined constant ǫkj ≤ Amax can
be gauged to control the queueing delay bound. Any algorithm
that maintains bounded Zkj (t) and qkj (t) ensures jobs in
queue qkj (t) are served within bounded worst-case delay. The
rationale can be explained as follows. Consider jobs arriving at
t. If qkj reaches 0 within the subsequent d time slots, the jobs
are served within d time slots. Otherwise, Zkj has a constant
arrival rate ǫkj , and the same departure rate with qkj , i.e.,
Ukj (t)+G
k
j (t). Let Z
k,max
j and q
k,max
j be the upper bound of
the size of queue Zkj and qkj at any time, respectively. For the d
time slots following t, the total arrival into Zkj minus the total
departure is ǫkj d −
∑t+d
τ=t+1[U
k
j (τ ) + G
k
j (τ )], as Z
k
j is bounded
by Zk,maxj , ǫkj d −
∑t+d
τ=t+1[U
k
j (τ ) + G
k
j (τ )] ≤ Z
k,max
j . When
d = ⌈(Zk,maxj + q
k,max
j )/ǫ
k
j ⌉, we have ǫkj d − Zk,maxj ≥ qk,maxj ,
hence, ∑t+d
τ=t+1[U
k
j (τ ) + G
k
j (τ )] ≥ q
k,max
j ≥ q
k
j (t + 1). As job
queues are FIFO, all jobs arriving at time slot t will be served
within a delay of d = ⌈(Zk,maxj + qk,maxj )/ǫkj ⌉ time slots.
C. Cost Minimization Problem Formulation
The inter-cloud traffic includes two types: (i) traffic among
VMs of the same job placed in different clouds, and (ii)
traffic due to VM migration of leftover jobs. The type (i)
traffic from cloud i to cloud j due to job l ∈ ∪KUkj ∪ U˜j ,
is ∑gk
r=1
∑gk
s=1 I
l
i,r(t) · I
l
j,s(t) · T
l
r,s(t). It is the i× jth entry of
matrix [I l(t) ·T l(t) ·I l(t)′], i.e., [I l(t) ·T l ·I l(t)′]i,j , where I l(t)′
is the transpose of I l(t). When l ∈ U˜j , job l is a leftover job.
I ls(t− 1) is the indicator of the placement of job l’s VM s at
time slot t−1. VM s of job l is migrated if I ls(t) ·I ls(t−1) = 0,
and is not migrated otherwise.
For type (ii) traffic, we assume that only the up-to-date
virtual machine states need to be transferred for VM migration,
such that the temporary VM downtime during migration is
short. Let φk be the data volume involved when migrating
one VM of a type-k job. The migration traffic from cloud i
to cloud j due to job l’s VMs is ∑gk
s=1 I
l
i,s(t− 1) · I
l
j,s(t) · φ
k
.
It is the i × jth entry of matrix [I l(t − 1) · I l(t)′ · φk], i.e.,
[I l(t− 1) · I l(t)′ · φk]i,j .
4At time slot t, the cost for running a leftover job l ∈ U˜j ,
for running a newly scheduled job l ∈ Ukj , and for dropping
a job l is cl =

∑J
i=1 βi(t)
∑gk
s=1 I
l
i,s(t) +
∑
h6=i
∑J
i=1 λh[I
l(t) · T l · I l(t)′]h,i
+
∑
h6=i
∑J
i=1 λh
∑gk
s=1 I
l
h,s(t− 1) · I
l
i,s(t) · φ
k,
if l ∈ U˜j , j ∈ [1, J ];∑J
i=1 βi(t)
∑gk
s=1 I
l
i,s(t) +
∑
h6=i
∑J
i=1 λh[I
l(t) · T l · I l(t)′]h,i,
if l ∈ Ukj , j ∈ [1, J ], k ∈ [1, K];
αkj , if l is dropped.
The time-averaged cost incurred by all cloud j’s jobs is,
Cj(t) = lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
E


∑
l∈U˜j
cl +
∑
l∈∪KU
k
j
cl +
K∑
k=1
αkjG
k
j (t)


Finally the global cost minimization problem is:
min
J∑
j=1
Cj(t)
s.t. (1)− (4).
The decision variables are Ukj (t), I li,s(t), and Gkj (t), ∀i, j ∈
[1, J ], k ∈ [1,K], l ∈ ∪KU
k
j ∪ U˜j , s ∈ [1, g
k], t ∈ [0, T ].
Notations are summarized in a notation table below for ease
of reference.
K # of job types Nj # of servers in cloud j
wk service time of type-k job Zkj virtual queue length
d max response delay T l traffic matrix of job l
Γ a time frame cl cost of job l
J total # of IaaS cloud providers in the federation.
Hj # of instances a server in cloud j can host.
βj(t) cost of hosting a VM in cloud j.
λi cost of transferring a unit volume of data out of cloud i.
gk # of VMs required by type-k job.
Akj (t) # of type-k jobs arriving at t in cloud j.
Amax max # of one type of jobs arriving in one cloud at one time.
qkj queue backlog for unscheduled type-k jobs in cloud j.
Ukj (t) # of newly served type-k jobs at t in cloud j.
Gkj (t) # of type-k jobs dropped at t in cloud j.
G
k,max
j max # of type-k jobs being dropped at t in cloud j.
Ili,s 1/0: whether instance s of job l is placed in cloud i.
U˜j set of leftover jobs from cloud j.
Ukj set of newly scheduled type-k jobs from cloud j.
φk data size for migrating one VM of type-k job.
DH set of data centers not allocating VMs to cloud j∗.
DL set of data centers allocating VMs to cloud j∗.
αkj penalty for dropping one type-k job in cloud j.
ǫkj parameter used as the incoming rate for virtual queue of qkj .
IV. THE LYAPUNOV FRAMEWORK
We apply the Lyapunov optimization framework to translate
the long-term cost optimization in the cloud federation into
one-shot minimization problems. We design a centralized
online algorithm for achieving close-to-optimal time-averaged
cost by solving the one-shot minimization in Sec. V, and
design a double auction mechanism for eliciting desirable
cloud behaviours for achieving the same close-to-optimal
performance in Sec. VI.
A. Dealing with Jobs with Varying Lengths
Departing from existing literature on Lyapunov optimiza-
tion, we consider jobs with varying lengths, resulting in left-
over jobs carried over into a subsequent time slot, complicating
optimization decision making in the system.
We group Γ time slots into a refresh frame, where Γ >
wmax and wmax is the largest time duration of a job. The
time slots can be divided into R consecutive frames. In each
frame, only new jobs that can be completed within the frame
are taken into consideration for scheduling. Hence, there are
no leftover jobs running in data centers at the beginning of
each frame. Control decisions from the previous frame are
therefore isolated from those in the current frame.
B. One-Shot Drift-Plus-Penalty Minimization
Let Θj(t) = (qj ,Zj) be the vector of job queues and virtual
queues in cloud j. Θ(t) = (Θ1(t),Θ2(t), ...,ΘJ (t)). Define
the Lyapunov function of Θj(t) as:
L(Θj(t)) =
1
2
K∑
k=1
[(wk)2qkj (t)
2 + Zkj (t)
2] (8)
The Lyapunov optimization framework guarantees that the
long-term global cost minimization in the federated cloud can
be achieved by minimizing the following one-shot drift-plus-
penalty under constraints (1) (2) (3) (6). Detailed derivation
of the function is provided in Appendix A.
ϕ1(t) + ϕ2(t) (9)
where
ϕ1(t) =
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
[V αkj − (w
k)2qkj (t)− Z
k
j (t)]G
k
j (t)
ϕ2(t) =
∑
l∈∪J ,KU
k
j
V cl −
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
[(wk)2qkj (t) + Z
k
j (t)]U
k
j (t)
+
∑
l∈∪J U˜j
V cl
and V is a non-negative parameter chosen by the algorithm to
tune the tradeoff between cost and service response delay.
V. ONE-SHOT OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM FOR GLOBAL
COST MINIMIZATION
We next decompose the minimization of the one-shot drift-
plus-penalty in (9) into two independent sub-problems, and
solve them using a dynamic algorithm for determining job
dropping and another for scheduling existing and new jobs,
respectively. VMs of the same job are placed in the same
cloud, for practical feasibility. We prove that our dynamic al-
gorithm approaches optimal one-shot drift-plus-penalty within
a constant gap.
Job Dropping. The first sub-problem of minimizing (9)
requires cloud providers to make optimal decisions on the
number of dropped jobs, by solving the following minimiza-
tion:
min ϕ1(t)
s.t. (6) (10)
The solution of (10) is:
5Gkj (t) =
{
Gk,maxj , if (wk)2qkj (t) + Zkj (t) > V αkj ;
0, if (wk)2qkj (t) + Zkj (t) ≤ V αkj .
(11)
When V αkj < (wk)2qkj (t) + Zkj (t), cloud j can not satisfy
SLO for all its jobs, and has to drop some jobs. It is desirable
in practice for the cloud provider j to conduct admission
control on the maximum job arrival rate Amax , to avoid job
drops. We will assume such admission control for now, and
discuss its realization at the end of this section.
Leftover Job Migration & New Job Scheduling. The second
sub-problem involves decisions on leftover job migration and
new job scheduling that affect ϕ2(t), as follows:
min ϕ2(t)
s.t. (1)(2)(3) (12)
(12) is a non-linear integer program (NLIP) with inter-cloud
traffic for communication among VMs in the same job (due to
the non-linear terms in cl). When VMs of the same job reside
in the same cloud, (12) becomes a linear integer program as
follows,
min ϕ˜2(t)
s.t. (1)(2)(3) (13)
and can be solved by the following approximation algorithm.
Now that the VM placement of any VM of a job l is the
same, i.e., I l1 = I l2 = . . . = I lgk , we apply vector I l0 to represent
the placement of job l. We have ∑gk
s=1 I
l
i,s = g
kI li,0, and
ϕ˜2(t) =
∑
l∈∪J ,KU
k
j
J∑
i=1
[βi(t)−
(wk)2qkj (t) + Z
k
j (t)
V gk
]V gkI li,0(t)
+
∑
l∈∪J U˜j
J∑
i=1
[βi(t) +
∑
h6=i
λhI
l
h,0(t− 1) · φ
kl ]V gklI li,0(t)
Variables of I li,0’s are coupled in constraint (3), the VM
capacity constraint at each cloud’s data center. Further anal-
ysis reveals that to minimize ϕ˜2(t), available VMs should
be allocated to the job queue with the largest value of
(wk)2qkj (t)+Z
k
j (t)
V gk
among all cloud providers and job types. Let
this queue be the queue of type k∗ jobs in cloud j∗. Jobs from
this queue will be scheduled to run in clouds with cost βi(t) <
(wk
∗
)2qk
∗
j∗ (t)+Z
k∗
j∗ (t)
V gk
∗ . Let DL and DH denote the set of clouds
with cost smaller than and no smaller than (w
k∗)2qk
∗
j∗ (t)+Z
k∗
j∗ (t)
V gk
∗ ,
respectively. Clouds in DL will allocate all their VMs not
occupied by leftover jobs, i.e., NiHi − ∑l∈∪J U˜j gklI li,0(t),
to serve cloud j∗’s type-k∗ jobs. Then constraint (3) can be
transformed to: ∑
j∈J
∑
l∈U˜j
gklIli,0(t) ≤ NiHi, 1 ≤ i ≤ J ; (14)
∑
j∈J
∑
l∈∪KU
k
j
gkIli,0(t) = 0, ∀i ∈ DH ; (15)
∑
l∈Uk
∗
j∗
gk
∗
Ili,0(t) ≤ NiHi −
∑
j∈J
∑
l∈U˜j
gklIli,0(t), ∀i ∈ DL. (16)
Constraint (14) states that the number of VMs needed by
migrated leftover jobs can not exceed the VM capacity at
each cloud. Constraint (15) ensures no new job is scheduled
to clouds in DH . Servers in DH are turned off except those
used for serving leftover jobs. Constraint (16) implies that as
many type-k∗ jobs of cloud j∗ as possible are scheduled to
the available VMs in clouds in DL.
Substituting (15), (16) into ϕ˜2(t), we obtain the following
optimization problem for leftover job migration,
min
∑
l∈∪J U˜j
{
∑
i∈DH
gklIli,0(t) · [βi(t) +
∑
h6=i
λhI
l
h,0(t − 1) · φ
kl ] +
∑
i∈DL
gkl
· Ili,0(t)[
(wk
∗
)2qk
∗
j∗ (t) + Z
k∗
j∗ (t)
V gk
∗ +
∑
h6=i
λhI
l
h,0(t − 1) · φ
kl ]}
s.t. (14) (17)
There are four cases of job migration: (1) When a leftover
job in cloud j ∈ DH is migrated to a cloud i ∈ DL, the objec-
tive function of (17) is decremented by V ·gkl [βj(t)−λjφkl−
(wk
∗
)2qk
∗
j∗ (t)+Z
k∗
j∗ (t)
V gk
∗ ]; (2) When a leftover job in j ∈ DH is mi-
grated to i ∈ DH , the objective function of (17) is decremented
by V · gkl [βj(t)− λjφkl − βi(t)]; (3) When a leftover job in
j ∈ DL is migrated to i ∈ DH , the objective function of (17)
is incremented by V ·gkl [βi(t)+λjφkl−
(wk
∗
)2qk
∗
j∗ (t)+Z
k∗
j∗ (t)
V gk
∗ ];
(4) When a leftover job in j ∈ DL is migrated to a i ∈ DL,
the objective function of (17) is incremented by V · gklλjφkl .
Since (17) is a minimization problem, no migration of left-
over jobs across clouds in DL should happen. For migration
of leftover jobs across clouds in DH , the algorithm first sorts
clouds in DH from the highest-cost one to the lowest-cost
one. It then migrates jobs from higher-cost clouds to lower-
cost clouds until no further reduction to (17) is possible.
We summarize our complete algorithm to solve the one-shot
minimization problem (9) in Algorithm 1.
Theorem 1.[Approximation Ratio] Algorithm 1 computes
a solution ϕ˜2(a)(t) satisfying ϕ˜2(a)(t) ≤ ϕ˜2∗(t) + C ≤
ϕ∗2(t) + C. Here ϕ˜2
∗
(t) is the optimal solution of the LP
relaxation of (13). ϕ∗2(t) is the optimal solution of (12).
C = V Jgmax·max{α
max
gmin
−βmin, βmax+λmaxφmax−βmin−
λminφmin}. V is the algorithm parameter. gmax (gmin) is the
maximum (minimum) number of VMs requested by a job. βmax
(βmin) is the maximum (minimum) cost of one VM. λmaxφmax
(λminφmin) is the maximum (minimum) cost for migrating one
VM. αmax is the maximum penalty for dropping one job.
Placing all VMs of the same job in the same cloud can lead
to waste of VMs in a cloud, which are not sufficient to handle
a job. We observe that the optimal solution of the LP relaxation
(LPR) to (13) is smaller than that of (12), i.e., ϕ˜2∗(t) ≤ ϕ∗2(t),
because the solution of LP relaxation does not waste VMs
due to integer solution constraint and not need to consider
inter-VM traffic cost. Algorithm 1 schedules as many jobs as
possible to a cloud in DL. Hence, the number of wasted VMs
in one data center is bounded by the maximum number of
VMs a job requests, gmax. The total number of wasted VMs
in all J data centers is bounded by Jgmax. The maximum
6Algorithm 1 Approximation Algorithm to Solve One-shot
Cost Minimization Problem (13)
Input: qkj (t); Zkj (t); I l(t−1), l ∈ U˜j ; βj(t); λj ; φk; Nj ; Hj ; V ; ǫkj ;
Γ > wmax; (∀k ∈ K, ∀j ∈ J ); Left (Storing sequenced leftover
jobs according to value βhl (t) − λhlφkl ); DC (Datacenters sorted
by cost βi(t)).
Output: I l(t), l∈Ukj ∪U˜j ; Gkj (t), ∀k∈K, j∈J
1: // *** Leftover Job Migration *** //
2: l = 0, the leftover job with the highest value; i = 0, the cloud
with the lowest cost. //Initialize l and i.
3: while (l ≤∑J
j=1 U˜j & i ≤ J & Left(l).value > DC(i).cost)
do
4: if (DC(i).available ≥ Left(l).g) then
5: Migrate job l to cloud i.
6: Update the number of available VMs in DC(i) by minus
gkl .
7: l ++;
8: else
9: i++;
10: end if
11: end while
12: // *** New Job Scheduling *** //
13: for Each job type-k ∈ K with wk ≤ Γ − (t mod Γ) and each
cloud provider j ∈ J do
14: Identify the job queue with the largest (w
k)2qkj (t)+Z
k
j (t)
V gk
, let it
be type-k∗ jobs in cloud j∗.
15: end for
16: for Each cloud d ∈ D do
17: if ( (w
k∗ )2qk
∗
j∗
(t)+Zk
∗
j∗
(t)
V gk
∗ ≤ βi(t)) then
18: Keep servers running leftover jobs on; turn off all other
servers
19: else
20: Keep servers running leftover jobs on, configure all other
servers to run VMs to serve type-k∗ jobs of cloud provider
j∗.
21: end if
22: end for
23: Decide the number of jobs to drop according to Eqn. (11)
cost for wasting one VM is V · max{α
max
gmin
− βmin, βmax +
λmaxφmax − βmin − λminφmin}, it equals to the maximum
value by which the one-shot drift-plus-penalty will be deduced
if the one VM can be used for serving a job. Compared with
the LP relaxation of (13), Algorithm 1 at most wastes Jgmax
VMs. The solution of Algorithm 1 is within a constant C
from the optimal solution of the LPR of (13), i.e., ϕ˜2(a)(t) ≤
ϕ˜2
∗(t)+C, C = V Jgmax·max{α
max
gmin
−βmin, βmax+λmaxφmax−
βmin−λminφmin}. Hence, we derive ϕ˜2(a)(t) ≤ ϕ∗2(t)+C. The
details of the proof is in Appendix B.
Theorem 2.[Conditions for No Job Drop] When the max-
imum arrival number for any type of job in one time slot,
Amax, and the total number of VM provisioning in clouds,∑J
j=1NjHj , satisfy Jgmaxwmax · (w
max)2Amax+ǫmax
gmin
<
Γ−wmax
Γ ·
2
∑
J
j=1 NjHj
(gmax)2 , i.e., the total arrival rate of all the
queues is smaller than Γ−w
max
Γ fraction of the service capac-
ity, the value [(wk)2qkj (t) + Zkj (t)]/gk will be bounded.
Proof sketch: We can see value [(wk)2qkj (t) + Zkj (t)]/gk
as the queue backlog of a new-defined queue corresponding
to cloud j’s type-k job as follows: in each time slot, the
input of the queue is no larger than [(wk)2Amax + ǫmax]/gk,
ǫmax = max{ǫkj , ∀j, k}; the output of the queue is no smaller
than 2Ukj /gk. Scheduling of new jobs in Algorithm 1 is a
variation of the MaxWeight algorithm. In each time slot it
schedules the type of jobs k∗ in cloud j∗ corresponding to the
largest [(wk∗)2qk∗j∗ (t) + Zk
∗
j∗ (t)]/g
k∗
, which can be completed
within the current time frame. This scheduling algorithm is
the same with the Myopic MaxWeight algorithm proposed by
Maguluri et.al. [25]. The total arrival rate for all the queues
[(wk)2qkj (t) + Z
k
j (t)]/g
k is upper-bounded by Jgmaxwmax ·
(wmax)2Amax+ǫmax
gmin
, where Jgmaxwmax is the total number of
queues. The total service capacity is larger than 2
∑
J
j=1 NjHj
(gmax)2 .
Hence, according to Maguluri et al.’s result [25], when
Jgmaxwmax· (w
max)2Amax+ǫmax
gmin
< Γ−w
max
Γ ·
2
∑
J
j=1 NjHj
(gmax)2 , i.e.,
the total arrival rate of all the queues is smaller than Γ−w
max
Γ
fraction of the service capacity, the queue is strongly stable.
The queue backlog will be bounded. As the penalty αkj for
dropping a type-k job satisfies αkj ≥ [(wk)2qkj (t)+Zkj (t)]/V ,
there will be no job drop according to (11).
Theorem 3. When the no job drop condition is satisfied, and
the length of a time frame satisfies Γ > wmax, with the
assumption that the dynamic virtual machine costs, βj(t),
∀j ∈ [1, J ], and the size for transferring one VM, φk,
k ∈ [1,K], are ergodic processes, there exists some θ > 0,
the time-averaged cost achieved by Algorithm 1 is within a
constant gap from C (1+θ)ΓΓ−wmax , which is the offline minimum
total cost when the total workload arrival rate to the federation
is within Γ−wmax(1+θ)Γ of the total workload service rate. i.e.,
lim
R→∞
1
RΓ
R−1∑
n=0
(n+1)Γ−1∑
t=nΓ
E[
J∑
j=1
Cj(t)]
≤ C
(1+θ)Γ
Γ−wmax +
B1
V
+
B2Γ
V
+
B3
ΓV
+
B4
Γ
Here, B1, B2, B3, B4 are constants.
If V →∞, Γ→∞, Γ
V
→∞ and θ scales down infinitely
close to 0, our algorithm achieves time-averaged cost infinitely
close to the offline optimum. The proof of Theorem 3 is similar
to our technique used in [26] for proving the performance
of extended Lyapunov optimization which takes jobs with
varying workloads into consideration. The detail of the proof
is in our technical report [27].
VI. A DOUBLE AUCTION MECHANISM FOR ONE-SHOT
COST MINIMIZATION
In Sec. V, our algorithm assumes a cooperative environment
where individual cloud’s workload and cost information are
known for global cost minimization. We next design a double
auction mechanism that elicits such truthful information, and
guarantees global cost minimization in cases of selfish clouds.
A. The Double Auction Model
Each individual cloud in the federation is an agent in
the double auction, whose strategies are buy-bids and sell-
bids submitted to the auctioneer, a third party broker in the
federated cloud.
7Individual Cloud’s Utility. Let P (i) and P (l) denote cloud
i’s proceeds from VM sales and charges paid for outsourcing
a job l, respectively. Let xli be the allocation variable such that
when xli = 1, the bid for job l wins a bundle of gkl VMs from
cloud i ( job l can be migrated or newly scheduled to run in
cloud i); when xli = 0, the bid does not win a bundle of gkl
VMs from cloud i. A cloud can simultaneously win a set of
atomic buy-bids. Its utility from winning a bid for a leftover
job l ∈ U˜j is the reduction of its one-shot drift-plus-penalty
through it, µ(xl) = V ·∑J
i=1[(βhl − λhl · φ
kl)gkl − P (l)].
The utility from winning a bid for one new job l ∈ Uk
∗
j ,max
j
is µ(xl) = V ·∑J
i=1[
(w
k∗
j )2q
k∗
j
j
(t)+Z
k∗
j
j
(t)
V
− P (l)].
The utility of an individual cloud provider from selling VMs
is µ(xi) = V · [P (i)−
∑
j∈J
∑
l∈U˜j∪U
k∗
j
,max
j
βig
klxli].
Now we can derive a cloud’s valuation for a bundle of VMs:
Valuation of VMs for leftover jobs: For leftover job l ∈ U˜j ,
each job will request gkl VMs. Its valuation for a bundle of
gkl VMs is gkl · [βhl(t)−λhlφkl ]. Here hl is the cloud where
leftover job l is at the beginning of time slot t.
Valuation of VMs for new jobs: For a new type-k∗j job
from cloud j, its valuation for one bundle of gk
∗
j VMs is
[(wk
∗
j )2q
k∗j
j (t) + Z
k∗j
j (t)]/V .
Bidding. A cloud provider’s buy-bid (gkli , bl) contains a
request for gkl co-located VMs in cloud i, for hosting a job l,
and a bid price bl. The cloud provider can submit a number
of XOR’ed VM bundle bids for each leftover job l ∈ U˜j :
(gkl1 , b
l), . . . , (gklJ , b
l), but at most one of them can win. The
cloud provider bids for multiple bundles for only one type of
new jobs, type k∗j = argmaxk (w
k)2qkj (t)+Z
k
j (t)
gk
. The number
of bundles the cloud provider wants to buy for its new jobs
of type k∗j are as many as possible, because when the cost of
one bundle for one new job is below the buy-bid, the cloud
provider could increase its utility when obtaining it. We use
U
k∗j ,max
j = |U
k∗j ,max
j | to represent the number of bundles cloud
provider j bids for for its new type-k∗j jobs, U
k∗j ,max
j is the
set of new jobs cloud provider j submits bids for. The bid for
one bundle is an XOR’ed bid of: (gkl1 , bl), . . . , (g
kl
J , b
l).
A cloud provider’s sell-bid is simpler, consisting of an ask-
price sj for one VM and the maximum number of supply
NjHj −
∑
i∈J
∑
l∈U˜i
∑gk
s=1 I
l
j,s(t− 1).
Winner Determination. After collecting all the bids from
cloud providers, the auctioneer solves the winner determina-
tion problem (WDP), to make decisions on allocation variables
xli’s to maximize the total surplus, i.e., the total bid price for
buying VMs minus the total ask price for selling VMs.
max
∑
j∈J
∑
l∈U˜j∪U
k∗
j
,max
j
J∑
i=1
[bl · xli − si · g
klxli]
s.t.
J∑
i=1
xli ≤ 1,∀l ∈ U˜j ∪ U
k∗j ,max
j , 1 ≤ j ≤ J ;∑
j∈J
∑
l∈U˜j∪U
k∗
j
,max
j
gklxli ≤ NiHi −
∑
j∈J
∑
l∈U˜j
gklIli,0(t− 1),
1 ≤ i ≤ J ;
xli ∈ {0, 1}, ∀l ∈ U˜j ∪ U
k∗j ,max
j . (18)
We point out the close connection between WDP (18) and
problem (13) in the following claim.
Claim 4. The objective function of WDP (18) equals
− 1
V
ϕ˜2(t)+
∑
j∈J
∑
l∈U˜j
gklβhl(t) when b
l = gkl ·[βhl (t)−λhlφ
kl ]
for l ∈ U˜j , bl = [(wk∗j )2qk
∗
j
j (t) + Z
k∗j
j (t)]/V for l ∈ U
k∗j ,max
j ,
si = βi(t), and xli’s correspond to I li,0’s as follows: for a new job
U
k∗j
j , x
l
i = I
l
i,0; for a new job l ∈ Uk
∗
j ,max
j − U
k∗j
j , x
l
i = 0; for a
leftover job l ∈ U˜j , xli = I li,0,∀i 6= hl; xlhl = 0.
The details of the proof is in Appendix C.
Claim 4 shows that when each cloud provider bids truthfully
for buying bundles of VMs for jobs and for selling VMs.
We can derive the optimal allocation decisions xli’s from
the optimal solution to (13), I li,0’s, through the correspon-
dence between them. Hence, Algorithm 1 can compute an
approximation result APX no smaller than LPR∗ − C
V
, i.e.,
APX ≥ LPR∗ − C
V
, where APX is the approximation
solution under Algorithm 1, and LPR∗ is the optimal solution
of the LP relaxation of WDP (18). This can also be written
as APX ≥ (1− δ) · LPR∗, where δ = C
V ·LPR∗
.
Next, to elicit truth-telling from individual clouds, we design
a randomized double auction that is truthfulness in expectation,
employing Algorithm 1 as a building block.
B. A Truthful Randomized Double Auction Mechanism Design
As shown in Algorithm 2, the randomized double auction
includes four main steps. (i) We run the fractional VCG
mechanism through solving the LP relaxation of the WDP,
obtaining the fractional VCG allocation and charges/payments.
(ii) We apply the LP duality based decomposition technique
for decomposing the fractional VCG allocation, scaled by
(1 − δ), into a weighted combination of integral allocations.
(iii) We randomly choose an integral allocation from the
combination, with weights taken as probabilities. (iv) the
fractional VCG payments are scaled down by a factor of (1−δ)
to be the payments.
Algorithm 2 A Randomized Double Auction at time t
1: Solve the LPR of (18) to obtain solution x∗, determine fractional
payments PF (l) and PF (i) according to VCG mechanism.
2: Decompose the scaled down x∗ into weighted integral solutions:
(1− δ)x∗ =
∑
z
ρzx(z)
3: - Solve primal-dual LPs using the ellipsoid method;
4: - employ Algorithm 1 as the separation oracle
5: Select x(z)’s randomly with probability ρz;
6: for l ∈ U˜j ∪ U
k∗j ,max
j , 1 ≤ j ≤ J do
7: cloud provider j pays PR(l) = PF (l) · 1∑J
i=1 x
l∗
i
for winning
a bid for its job l
8: end for
9: for 1 ≤ i ≤ J do
10: Cloud provider i is paid PR(i) = PF (i) ·∑J
j=1
∑
l∈U˜j∪U
k∗
j
,max
j
xli(z)/
∑J
j=1
∑
l∈U˜j∪U
k∗
j
,max
j
xl∗i for
selling VMs under allocation x(z)
11: end for
The Fractional VCG Pricing Mechanism. The LPR of
the WDP can be solved efficiently. Let x∗ denote its optimal
8(fractional) solution. The VCG payment for each winning bid
for a job is PF (l) =
V (l)−
∑
j∈J
J∑
i=1
[
∑
l′ 6=l,l′∈U˜j∪U
k∗
j
,max
j
bl
′
· xl
′
i −
∑
l∈U˜j∪U
k∗
j
,max
j
si · g
klxli].
(19)
where V (l) is the solution of the LPR of (18) when the cloud
provider bids 0 for a leftover job l or one new job l. The
VCG payments to a cloud provider for provisioning VMs is
PF (i) =∑
j∈J
∑
l∈U˜j∪U
k∗
j
,max
j
[
J∑
i=1
bl · xli −
∑
i′ 6=i
si′ · g
kl · xli′ ]− V (i). (20)
where V (i) is the optimal solution of the LPR when available
VMs at cloud i is 0.
Decomposition of Fractional Solutions. The fractional VCG
pricing mechanism achieves truthfulness, but its allocation is
not practically applicable due to its fractional nature. Algo-
rithm 1 can compute an approximate integral solution to (18).
Let APX , WDP ∗, LPR∗ denote the solution of WDP under
Algorithm 1, the optimal solution of WDP, the optimal solution
of the LPR, respectively. Algorithm 1 achieves an approximate
result that is at least (1−δ) times the LPR. The approximation
ratio 1(1−δ) also verifies the integral gap of (18). In fact, we
have the following relation:
Integrality gap = LPR
∗
WDP ∗
≤
LPR∗
APX
≤
1
(1− δ)
where the first inequality is due to APX ≤WDP ∗.
Applying the decomposition technique of Carr et.al. [10]
and Lavi et.al. [11], we have the following result: Let Z be
the set of all integral solutions of WDP. With the LPR of WDP
(18), and a 1(1−δ) -approximation algorithm such as Algorithm
1, there is a polynomial algorithm that finds a polynomial
number of integral solutions x(1),x(2), . . . ,x(z), . . . , z ∈ Z
of WDP such that,
(1− δ)x∗ =
∑
z
ρzx(z)
The polynomial number of integral solutions x(z) and their
corresponding coefficients ρz can be obtained by solving the
following LP:
min
∑
z
ρz
s.t.
∑
z
ρzx
l
i(z) = (1− δ)x
l∗
i , l ∈ U˜j ∪ U
k∗j ,max
j , 1 ≤ i, j ≤ J ;∑
z
ρz ≥ 1;
ρz ≥ 0, ∀z ∈ Z.
Its dual is:
max (1− δ)
J∑
j=1
∑
l∈U˜j∪U
k∗
j
,max
j
J∑
i=1
xl∗i · ν
l
i + θ
s.t.
J∑
j=1
∑
l∈U˜j∪U
k∗
j
,max
j
J∑
i=1
xli(z) · ν
l
i + θ ≤ 1,∀z ∈ Z;
νli unconstrained, l ∈ U˜j ∪ U
k∗j ,max
j , 1 ≤ i, j ≤ J ;
θ ≥ 0.
The primal has an exponential number of variables, so
we consider its dual. The dual has an exponential number
of constraints and variables νli’s and θ. We can apply the
ellipsoid method to solve the dual, with Algorithm 1 used
as a separation oracle.
Before illustrating the ellipsoid method, we show the fol-
lowing claim:
Claim 5. Let ν = {νli} be any vector. νl+i = max{0, νli}.
Given any integer solution x̂ obtained from Algorithm 1 for
objective function ∑J
j=1
∑
l∈U˜j∪U
k∗
j
,max
j
∑J
i=1 x
l
i · ν
l+
i , one can
obtain x(z) by letting xli(z) = x̂li when νli ≥ 0 and 0
otherwise. We have ∑J
j=1
∑
l∈U˜j∪U
k∗
j
,max
j
∑J
i=1 x
l
i(z) · ν
l
i
≥ (1− δ)maxx∈P
∑J
j=1
∑
l∈U˜j∪U
k∗
j
,max
j
∑J
i=1 x
l
i · ν
l
i .
The details of the proof is in Appendix D.
The claim shows that for any vector of ν, we could find
an integer solution x(z) which achieves the social welfare
no smaller than (1 − δ) times the optimal solution of the
LPR. Based on this, we can prove that the optimal solution
of the dual is 1. Since νli = 0, θ = 1 is feasible, the optimal
solution of the dual is at least 1. Let νl∗i , θ∗ be given such
that (1 − δ)
∑J
j=1
∑
l∈U˜j∪U
k∗
j
,max
j
∑J
i=1 x
l∗
i · ν
l∗
i + θ
∗ > 1.
According to the claim, there exists a solution x(z) such that∑J
j=1
∑
l∈U˜j∪U
k∗
j
,max
j
∑J
i=1 x
l
i(z) · ν
l∗
i > 1− θ
∗
. Hence, νl∗i ,
θ∗ violate the constraint
∑J
j=1
∑
l∈U˜j∪U
k∗
j
,max
j
∑J
i=1 x
l
i(z) ·
νli + θ ≤ 1.
With the dual’s optimal solution equal to 1, we next il-
lustrate how to apply Algorithm 1 as the separation oracle
that returns the separation hyperplane in the ellipsoid method.
Let νl∗i , θ∗ denote the center of the current ellipsoid. When
(1 − δ)
∑J
j=1
∑
l∈U˜j∪U
k∗
j
,max
j
∑J
i=1 x
l∗
i · ν
l∗
i + θ
∗ < 1, we use
the half space (1 − δ)∑Jj=1∑
l∈U˜j∪U
k∗
j
,max
j
∑J
i=1 x
l∗
i · ν
l∗
i +
θ∗ ≥ 1 to cut the current ellipsoid; otherwise, we find
the separation hyperplane using Algorithm 1 as follows: Let
νl+i = max{0, ν
l∗
i }. Apply Algorithm 1 to objective function∑J
j=1
∑
l∈U˜j∪U
k∗
j
,max
j
∑J
i=1 x
l
i · ν
l+
i to get an integral solution
x̂(z). Let x(z) = x̂(z) if νl∗i ≥ 0 and 0 otherwise. According
to the fact, we have ∑J
j=1
∑
l∈U˜j∪U
k∗
j
,max
j
∑J
i=1 x
l
i(z) · ν
l∗
i ≥
(1 − δ)maxx∈P
∑J
j=1
∑
l∈U˜j∪U
k∗
j
,max
j
∑J
i=1 x
l
i · ν
l∗
i ≥ 1 − θ
∗
,
which can be used as the separation hyperplane.
C. Properties of Randomized Double Auction Mechanism
The fractional VCG double auction mechanism can give
a truthful and individual rational mechanism with alloca-
tion fF (bl, si) = x∗, the pricing scheme is pF (bl, si):
(PF (l),PF (i)). The fractional solutions make it unpractical
in real applications.
Our designed randomized double auction mechanism de-
termines the allocation fR(bl, si) = x(z) with a probability
ρz , z ∈ Z . The pricing scheme is pR(bl, si): PR(l) = 0
if job l does not win a bid, PR(l) = PF (l) · 1∑J
i=1 x
l∗
i
if
9job l wins a bid; PR(i) = 0 if cloud i does not sell VMs,
PR(i) = PF (i)·
∑J
j=1
∑
l∈U˜j∪U
k∗
j
,max
j
xli(z)
∑
J
j=1
∑
l∈U˜j∪U
k∗
j
,max
j
xl∗i
if cloud i sells VMs
and the randomly determined allocation is x(z). The price is
set this way to let the expectation of job l’s price equals to
(1−δ) ·PF (l) and the expectation of cloud i’s revenue equals
to (1− δ) · PF (i).
Definition (Truthfulness in expectation) A randomized
double auction mechanism (fR, pR) is truthful
in expectation if for any buyer l or seller i,
E[µ(fR(b˜l, b−l, si))] ≥ E[µ(f
R(bl
′
, b−l, si))], and
E[µ(fR(bl, s˜i, s−i))] ≥ E[µ(f
R(bl, s′i, si))], b
−l represents
any bids from other buyers except buyer l, s−i represents any
bids from other sellers except seller i, b˜l and s˜i are the true
valuations of buyer l and seller i, bl′ and s′i are any other
bids of buyer l and seller i.
We have the following theorem for the properties of our
designed randomized double auction mechanism.
Theorem 6. The randomized double auction mechanism in
Algorithm 2 is truthful in expectation, individual rational, and
1
1−δ -approximate to the WDP in (18).
Proof sketch: We can define a deterministic support mecha-
nism for the randomized double auction mechanism. The allo-
cation of the deterministic support mechanism is fD(bl, si) =
(1 − δ) · x∗ =
∑
z ρzx(z), the pricing scheme is pD(bl, si):
PD(l) = (1−δ)PF (l) = E[PR(l)], PD(i) = (1−δ)PF (i) =
E[PR(i)]. It is easy to prove the truthfulness, individual
rationality and 11−δ -approximation of the deterministic support
mechanism based on the VCG mechanism. We can prove the
randomized double auction mechanism preserves truthfulness,
individual rationality, and 11−δ -approximation of the support
mechanism.
Theorem 6 shows that the randomized double auction
mechanism can achieve the same approximation ratio with
Algorithm 1. Hence, according to Theorem 3, in the long term,
it achieves the time-averaged cost that is within a constant gap
from the offline optimum.
VII. SIMULATIONS
We evaluate our online resource trading algorithm among
3 IaaS clouds located in 3 different regions in North America
(N.Virginia, Oregon, Northern California). By default, each
cloud provider’s data center has 103 servers. Each server can
host 10 VMs. We extract the spot prices of medium instances
in different regions of Amazon EC2 [1] as the costs of
providing one VM. We use the price for data transfer out from
Amazon EC2 to Internet, i.e., $0.12 per GB, to calculate the
VM migration cost. The data needed to transfer for migrating
one VM is randomly selected in range 0-5 GB. One time slot
is 1 hour. The time length of a job and the number of VMs
in a job are both between [1, 5]. We extract hourly job arrival
patterns from the Google cluster trace [28] as our input. The
number of job arrivals in each hour to an individual cloud
is set according to the cumulated job requests of each type
submitted to the Google cluster during that hour.
A. Clouds’ Cost When They Trade or Not
We run Algorithm 1 for each cloud separately to simulate
one cloud’s operation without VM resource trading, and we
run Algorithm 2 to simulate 3 clouds’ operation with VM
trading, both under different values of V and Γ. We compare
the time-averaged cost of each individual cloud over 240 hours
under no trading and trading scenarios.
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Fig. 1. Clouds’ cost when they trade or do not trade for different V values.
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Fig. 2. Clouds’ cost when they trade or do not trade for different Γ values.
The cost for each individual cloud and the total cost are
depicted in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2. Fig. 1 shows how the cost
changes with parameter V , here Γ is set as 16wmax. Parameter
V represents the tradeoff ratio between drift representing job
queue backlog and penalty i.e. cost in the one slot drift-plus-
penalty minimization.When V increases, the cost when they
do not trade decreases, but the cost when they trade increases.
This is because the valuation for VMs is inversely proportional
to V . Under the same trading volume, a larger V means fewer
income from trading. Fig. 2 shows how the cost changes with
parameter Γ. As Γ increases, i.e. the length of one time frame
in which scheduled jobs should be completed, the cost will
increase to a stable value, because the limiting power of the
time frame on job scheduling becomes weaker as the length
of time frame is larger.
B. Ratio of Active Servers
Fig. 3 shows the ratio of total active servers in all clouds
when they trade or do not trade. The ratio of servers’ utilization
under trading is higher than that under no trading. This could
be to the contrary of reducing cost at the first sight. However,
while clouds trade their idle resources to serve others’ high-
value jobs and earn income, they can achieve better cost
reduction than letting resources idle.
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Fig. 3. Ratio of active servers.
C. Cost vs. Job Load
Fig. 4 shows job arrivals in cloud 3. Fig. 5 shows the
corresponding cost under trading and no trading. The pattern
of cost under trading matches the job pattern more closely.
The dynamic range of the costs when they trade is larger than
that when they do not trade, as when the job load is small,
idle servers can be sold to other clouds to obtain income to
compensate the cost.
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Fig. 4. Cloud 3’s job pattern.
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Fig. 5. Cloud 3’s cost pattern.
D. Average Delay of Jobs
We measure the average service response delay of jobs
under different V and Γ. Fig. 6 compares the average delay of
jobs when the clouds trade or not. The average delay actually
experienced by jobs is smaller with trading than without. The
reason is that dynamic costs in different data centers increase
the chances of jobs being scheduled at a time slot. As long
as one data center has low prices, jobs can be scheduled to
execute there.
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Fig. 6. Comparison of average delay of jobs.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We formulated a global cost minimization problem with
inter-cloud job scheduling and migration for exploiting the
temporal and spatial diversities in operational cost among
federated clouds. Lyapunov optimization theory is applied
for translating such long-term optimization into a one-shot
minimization problem. An effective approximation algorithm
is designed, and is translated into a truthful randomized double
auction through a recent LP-based decomposition technique,
with the same guarantee in approximation ratio.
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APPENDIX A
DERIVATION OF ONE-SHOT DRIFT-PLUS PENALTY
The one-shot drift for cloud provider j is
L(Θj(t+ 1))− L(Θj(t))
=
1
2
K∑
k=1
[(wkqkj (t+ 1))
2 + Zkj (t+ 1)
2]
−
1
2
K∑
k=1
[(wkqkj (t))
2 + Zkj (t)
2]
=
1
2
K∑
k=1
[(wk)2(qkj (t+ 1)
2 − qkj (t)
2) + Zkj (t+ 1)
2 − Zkj (t)
2]
≤ B +
K∑
k=1
[(wk)2qkj (t)(A
k
j (t)− U
k
j (t)−G
k
j (t))
+ Zkj (ǫ
k
j − U
k
j (t)−G
k
j (t))].
Here B = 12
∑K
k=1{(w
k)2(Amax)2 + (ǫkj )
2 + [(wk)2 +
1][Uk,maxj +G
k,max
j ]
2}.
The inequality is attributed to
qkj (t+ 1)
2 − qkj (t)
2
≤ [qkj (t)− U
k
j (t)−G
k
j (t)]
2 + Akj (t)
2
+ 2Akj (t) ·max{q
k
j (t)− U
k
j (t)−G
k
j (t)} − q
k
j (t)
2
≤ [Ukj (t) +G
k
j (t)]
2 + Akj (t)
2
− 2qkj (t)[U
k
j (t) +G
k
j (t)] + 2A
k
j (t)q
k
j (t)
≤ [Uk,maxj +G
k,max
j ]
2 + (Amaxj )
2
+ 2qkj (t)[A
k
j (t)− U
k
j (t)−G
k
j (t)],
and
Zkj (t+ 1)
2 − Zkj (t)
2
≤ [Zkj (t) + ǫ
k
j − U
k
j (t)−G
k
j (t)]
2 − Zkj (t)
2
≤ (ǫkj )
2 + [Uk,maxj +G
k,max
j ]
2
+ 2Zkj (t)[ǫ
k
j − U
k
j (t)−G
k
j (t)].
The one-shot drift for all clouds is
∆(Θ(t)) =
J∑
j=1
E{L(Θj(t+ 1)) − L(Θj(t))|Θ(t)}
≤B · J +
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
(wk)2qkj (t)
{
E[Akj (t)]− U
k
j (t)−G
k
j (t)
}
+
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
Zkj · [ǫ
k
j − U
k
j (t)−G
k
j (t)],
where B is a constant.
The one-shot drift-plus-penalty is
∆(Θ(t)) + V ·
J∑
j=1
[
∑
l∈∪U˜j
cl +
∑
l∈∪KU
k
j
cl +
K∑
k=1
αkjG
k
j (t)]
≤B · J +
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
(wk)2qkj (t)
{
E[Akj (t)]− U
k
j (t)−G
k
j (t)
}
+
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
Zkj · [ǫ
k
j − U
k
j (t)−G
k
j (t)]
+ V ·
J∑
j=1
[
∑
l∈∪U˜j
cl +
∑
l∈∪KU
k
j
cl +
K∑
k=1
αkjG
k
j (t)]
=B · J +
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
(wk)2qkj (t)E[A
k
j (t)] +
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
Zkj · ǫ
k
j
+
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
Gkj (t)[V α
k
j − (w
k)2qkj (t)− Z
k
j ]
+ V ·
J∑
j=1
∑
l∈∪KU
k
j
cl −
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
Ukj (t)[(w
k)2qkj (t) + Z
k
j ]
+ V ·
J∑
j=1
∑
l∈∪U˜j
cl.
Hence, the minimization of one-shot drift-plus-penalty is to
minimize ϕ1(t) + ϕ2(t), where
ϕ1(t) =
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
[V αkj − (w
k)2qkj (t)− Z
k
j (t)]G
k
j (t),
ϕ2(t) =
∑
l∈∪J ,KU
k
j
V cl −
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
[(wk)2qkj (t) + Z
k
j (t)]U
k
j (t)
+
∑
l∈∪J U˜j
V cl.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Let us first prove ϕ˜2∗(t) ≤ ϕ∗2(t), where ϕ˜2
∗
(t) is the
optimal solution of the LP Relaxation (LPR) of (13), and ϕ∗2(t)
is the optimal solution of (12).
The expression for ϕ2(t) can be rearranged as follows,
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ϕ2(t) =
∑
l∈∪J ,KU
k
j
V cl −
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
[(wk)2qkj (t) + Z
k
j (t)]U
k
j (t)
+
∑
l∈∪J U˜j
V cl
=
∑
l∈∪J ,KU
k
j
V {
J∑
i=1
βi(t)
gk∑
s=1
I li,s(t)
+
∑
h6=i
J∑
i=1
λh[I
l(t) · T l · I l(t)′]h,i}
+
∑
l∈∪J U˜j
V {
J∑
i=1
βi(t)
gk∑
s=1
I li,s(t)
+
∑
h6=i
J∑
i=1
λh[I
l(t) · T l · I l(t)′]h,i
+
∑
h6=i
J∑
i=1
λh
gk∑
s=1
I lh,s(t− 1) · I
l
i,s(t) · φ
k}
−
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
[(wk)2qkj (t) + Z
k
j (t)]U
k
j (t)
=
∑
l∈∪J ,KU
k
j
V {
J∑
i=1
βi(t)
gk∑
s=1
I li,s(t)}
−
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
[(wk)2qkj (t) + Z
k
j (t)]U
k
j (t)
+
∑
l∈∪J U˜j
V {
J∑
i=1
βi(t)
gk∑
s=1
I li,s(t)
+
∑
h6=i
J∑
i=1
λh
gk∑
s=1
I lh,s(t− 1) · I
l
i,s(t) · φ
k}
+
∑
l∈∪J ,KU
k
j
V
∑
h6=i
J∑
i=1
λh[I
l(t) · T l · I l(t)′]h,i
+
∑
l∈∪J U˜j
V
∑
h6=i
J∑
i=1
λh[I
l(t) · T l · I l(t)′]h,i
≥
∑
l∈∪J ,KU
k
j
V {
J∑
i=1
βi(t)
gk∑
s=1
I li,s(t)}
−
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
[(wk)2qkj (t) + Z
k
j (t)]U
k
j (t)
+
∑
l∈∪J U˜j
V {
J∑
i=1
βi(t)
gk∑
s=1
I li,s(t)
+
∑
h6=i
J∑
i=1
λh
gk∑
s=1
I lh,s(t− 1) · I
l
i,s(t) · φ
k}
=
∑
l∈∪J ,KU
k
j
J∑
i=1
{V βi(t)−
(wk)2qkj (t) + Z
k
j (t)
gk
}
gk∑
s=1
I li,s(t)
+
∑
l∈∪J U˜j
J∑
i=1
{V βi(t) + V
∑
h6=i
λhI
l
h,s(t− 1) · φ
k}
gk∑
s=1
I li,s(t).
The inequality is because ϕ2(t) includes the cost for the
inter-data center traffic among VMs of the same job located
in different data centers, while the RHS of the inequality,
∑
l∈∪J ,KU
k
j
J∑
i=1
{V βi(t)−
(wk)2qkj (t) + Z
k
j (t)
gk
}
gk∑
s=1
I li,s(t)
+
∑
l∈∪J U˜j
J∑
i=1
{V βi(t) + V
∑
h6=i
λhI
l
h,s(t− 1) · φ
k}
gk∑
s=1
I li,s(t),
(21)
does not take the cost for the inter-data center traffic among
VMs of the same job into consideration.
When I li,0(t) =
∑gk
s=1 I
l
i,s(t)
gk
, ϕ˜2(t) is equal to (21). Hence,
for any I li,s(t), we have the optimal solution of the LP
Relaxation of (13), ϕ˜2∗(t)
≤
∑
l∈∪J ,KU
k
j
J∑
i=1
{V βi(t)−
(wk)2qkj (t) + Z
k
j (t)
gk
}
gk∑
s=1
I li,s(t)
+
∑
l∈∪J U˜j
J∑
i=1
{V βi(t) + V
∑
h6=i
λhI
l
h,s(t− 1) · φ
k}
gk∑
s=1
I li,s(t).
So, ϕ˜2∗(t) ≤ ϕ∗2(t).
We next prove that ϕ˜2(a)(t) ≤ ϕ˜2∗(t) + C, where C =
V Jgmax · max{α
max
gmin
− βmin, βmax + λmaxφmax − βmin −
λminφmin}.
Let I li,0(t) denote VM placement of jobs under the optimal
solution of the LP Relaxation (LPR) of (13).
ϕ˜2
∗(t) =
∑
l∈∪J ,KU
k
j
J∑
i=1
[V βi(t)−
(wk)2qkj (t) + Z
k
j (t)
gk
]gkI li,0(t)
+
∑
l∈∪J U˜j
J∑
i=1
[V βi(t) + V
∑
h6=i
λhI
l
h,0(t− 1) · φ
k]gkI li,0(t)
≥(a)
∑
i∈DL
[V βi(t)−
(wk
∗
)2qk
∗
j∗ (t) + Z
k∗
j∗ (t)
gk∗
]
· [NiHi −
∑
l∈∪J U˜j
gkI li,0(t)]
+
∑
l∈∪J U˜j
J∑
i=1
[V βi(t) + V
∑
h6=i
λhI
l
h,0(t− 1) · φ
k]gkI li,0(t)
=
∑
i∈DL
[V βi(t)−
(wk
∗
)2qk
∗
j∗ (t) + Z
k∗
j∗ (t)
gk∗
] ·NiHi
+
∑
l∈∪J U˜j
∑
i∈DL
[
(wk
∗
)2qk
∗
j∗ (t) + Z
k∗
j∗ (t)
gk∗
+ V
∑
h6=i
λhI
l
h,0(t− 1) · φ
k] · gkI li,0(t)
+
∑
l∈∪J U˜j
∑
i∈DH
[V βi(t) + V
∑
h6=i
λhI
l
h,0(t− 1) · φ
k]gkI li,0(t).
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The inequality (a) is because ϕ˜2(t) has a lower bound when
all its idle VMs in data centers DL after leftover job migration
are used to run new jobs of type-k∗ in cloud j∗, i.e., the type
of jobs with the largest value (w
k)2qkj (t)+Z
k
j (t)
gk
.
Let I li,0(t)(a) denote VM placement of jobs under Algorithm
1. Algorithm 1 only schedules new jobs of type-k∗ in cloud j∗
to idle VMs in data centersDL after leftover job migration. We
have
∑
l∈Uk
∗
j∗
gk
∗
I li,0(t)
(a) = NiHi−
∑
l∈∪J U˜j
gkI li,0(t)
(a)−
gri , where gri is the number of idle VMs in data center i
that are not enough to host a type-k∗ job in cloud j∗, and
gri < gk
∗
.
ϕ˜2
(a)(t)
=
∑
l∈Uk
∗
j∗
∑
i∈DL
[V βi(t)−
(wk
∗
)2qk
∗
j∗ (t) + Z
k∗
j∗ (t)
gk∗
]gk
∗
I li,0(t)
(a)
+
∑
l∈∪J U˜j
J∑
i=1
[V βi(t) + V
∑
h6=i
λhI
l
h,0(t− 1) · φ
k]gkI li,0(t)
(a)
=
∑
i∈DL
[V βi(t)−
(wk
∗
)2qk
∗
j∗ (t) + Z
k∗
j∗ (t)
gk∗
]
· [NiHi −
∑
l∈∪J U˜j
gkI li,0(t)
(a) − gri ]
+
∑
l∈∪J U˜j
J∑
i=1
[V βi(t) + V
∑
h6=i
λhI
l
h,0(t− 1) · φ
k]gkI li,0(t)
(a)
=
∑
i∈DL
[V βi(t)−
(wk
∗
)2qk
∗
j∗ (t) + Z
k∗
j∗ (t)
gk∗
]NiHi
−
∑
i∈DL
[V βi(t)−
(wk
∗
)2qk
∗
j∗ (t) + Z
k∗
j∗ (t)
gk∗
]gri
+
∑
l∈∪J U˜j
∑
i∈DL
[
(wk
∗
)2qk
∗
j∗ (t) + Z
k∗
j∗ (t)
gk∗
+ V
∑
h6=i
λhI
l
h,0(t− 1) · φ
k]gkI li,0(t)
(a)
+
∑
l∈∪J U˜j
∑
i∈DH
[V βi(t) + V
∑
h6=i
λhI
l
h,0(t− 1) · φ
k]gkI li,0(t)
(a).
The above expression currently only includes variables of
VM placement of leftover jobs. According to Algorithm 1,
the leftover jobs in the data center with the highest cost are
migrated first to the available data center with the lowest cost.
After the leftover job migration, there are two cases: (1) All
leftover jobs are in or migrated to data centers in set DL. (2)
There are leftover jobs in data center set DH .
Let us analyze the value of ϕ˜2(a)(t) under these two cases
respectively.
(1) All leftover jobs are in or migrated to data centers in DL:
In this case,
∑
l∈∪J U˜j
∑
i∈DH
[V βi(t) + V
∑
h 6=i λhI
l
h,0(t −
1) · φk]gkI li,0(t)
(a) =
∑
l∈∪J U˜j
∑
i∈DH
[V βi(t) +
V
∑
h 6=i λhI
l
h,0(t − 1) · φ
k]gkI li,0(t) = 0, and∑
l∈∪J U˜j
∑
i∈DL
[
(wk
∗
)2qk
∗
j∗ (t)+Z
k∗
j∗ (t)
gk
∗ + V
∑
h 6=i λhI
l
h,0(t −
1) · φk]gkI li,0(t)
(a) =
∑
l∈∪J U˜j
∑
i∈DL
[
(wk
∗
)2qk
∗
j∗ (t)+Z
k∗
j∗ (t)
gk
∗ +
V
∑
h 6=i λhI
l
h,0(t− 1) · φ
k] · gkI li,0(t). We have the following
relationship between ϕ˜2(a)(t) and ϕ˜2∗(t),
ϕ˜2
(a)(t) =ϕ˜2
∗(t)−
∑
i∈DL
[V βi(t)−
(wk
∗
)2qk
∗
j∗ (t) + Z
k∗
j∗ (t)
gk∗
]gri
≤ϕ˜2
∗(t) + V Jgmax[
(wk
∗
)2qk
∗
j∗ (t) + Z
k∗
j∗ (t)
V gk∗
− βi(t)]
≤(b)ϕ˜2
∗(t) + V Jgmax[
αmax
gmin
− βmin].
The inequality (b) is because αkj ’s are large enough
to guarantee there is no job dropping, and the value
(wk
∗
)2qk
∗
j∗ (t)+Z
k∗
j∗ (t)
V gk
∗ is bounded by α
k∗
j∗
gk
∗ .
(2) There are leftover jobs in data centers belonging to DH :
In this case, gri is the number of remaining idle VMs in data
center i ∈ DL that are not enough for hosting an entire leftover
job. The optimal solution of the LP Relaxation to (13) can
utilize these gri idle VMs for hosting a fractional leftover
job. We have ∑
l∈∪J U˜j
gkI li,0(t) =
∑
l∈∪J U˜j
gkI li,0(t)
(a) +
gri , ∀i ∈ DL. There are
∑
i∈DL
gri more VMs provided
by data centers in DH under Algorithm 1 than the optimal
solution of the LP Relaxation to (13).
ϕ˜2
(a)(t)− ϕ˜2
∗(t)
=−
∑
i∈DL
[V βi(t)−
(wk
∗
)2qk
∗
j∗ (t) + Z
k∗
j∗ (t)
gk∗
]gri
+
∑
l∈∪J U˜j
∑
i∈DL
[
(wk
∗
)2qk
∗
j∗ (t) + Z
k∗
j∗ (t)
gk∗
+ V
∑
h6=i
λhI
l
h,0(t− 1) · φ
k][gkI li,0(t)
(a) − gkI li,0(t)]
+
∑
l∈∪J U˜j
∑
i∈DH
[V βi(t) + V
∑
h6=i
λhI
l
h,0(t− 1) · φ
k]
· [gkI li,0(t)
(a) − gkI li,0(t)]
=
∑
i∈DL
gri [−V βi(t)− V
∑
h6=i
λhI
l
h,0(t− 1) · φ
k]
+
∑
l∈∪J U˜j
∑
i∈DH
[V βi(t) + V
∑
h6=i
λhI
l
h,0(t− 1) · φ
k]
· [gkI li,0(t)
(a) − gkI li,0(t)]
≤
∑
i∈DL
gri(−V βmin) +
∑
i∈DH
∑
l∈∪J U˜j
[gkI li,0(t)
(a) − gkI li,0(t)]V βmax
+
∑
i∈DH
∑
l∈∪J U˜j
[gkI li,0(t)
(a) − gkI li,0(t)]V
∑
h6=i
λhI
l
h,0(t− 1) · φ
k
+
∑
i∈DL
∑
l∈∪J U˜j
[gkI li,0(t)
(a) − gkI li,0(t)]V
∑
h6=i
λhI
l
h,0(t− 1) · φ
k
≤
∑
i∈DL
gri(−V βmin) +
∑
i∈DL
griV βmax
+
∑
i∈DL
griV λmaxφmax −
∑
i∈DL
griV λminφmin
≤V Jgmax[βmax + λmaxφmax − βmin − λminφmin].
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Summarizing the above two cases, we have ϕ˜2(a)(t) ≤
ϕ˜2
∗
(t)+C, where C = V Jgmax ·max{α
max
gmin
−βmin, βmax+
λmaxφmax − βmin − λminφmin}.
APPENDIX C
DETAIL PROOF OF CLAIM 4
Proof: Substitute bl = gkl · [βhl(t) − λhlφkl ] for l ∈ U˜j ,
bl = [(wk
∗
j )2q
k∗j
j (t) + Z
k∗j
j (t)]/V for l ∈ U
k∗j ,max
j , si = βi(t)
into the objective function of (18), and replace xli’s using I li,0’s
according to the following correspondence: for a new job l ∈
U
k∗j
j , x
l
i = I
l
i,0; for a new job l ∈ U
k∗j ,max
j −U
k∗j
j , x
l
i = 0; for
a leftover job l ∈ U˜j , xli = I li,0, ∀i 6= hl; xlhl = 0. We get
−
∑
j∈J
∑
l∈U
k∗
j
,max
j
J∑
i=1
[si · g
klxli − b
l · xli]
−
∑
j∈J
∑
l∈U˜j
J∑
i=1
[si · g
klxli − b
l · xli]
=−
∑
j∈J
∑
l∈U
k∗
j
j
J∑
i=1
1
V
gklI li,0[V βi(t)−
(wk
∗
j )2q
k∗j
j (t) + Z
k∗j
j (t)
gkl
]
−
∑
j∈J
∑
l∈U˜j
∑
i6=hl
gklI li,0[βi(t)− (βil (t)− λhlφ
kl)]
=−
∑
j∈J
∑
l∈U
k∗
j
j
J∑
i=1
1
V
gklI li,0[V βi(t)−
(wk
∗
j )2q
k∗j
j (t) + Z
k∗j
j (t)
gkl
]
−
∑
j∈J
∑
l∈U˜j
∑
i6=hl
gklI li,0[βi(t) + λhlφ
kl ]−
∑
j∈J
∑
l∈U˜j
∑
i=hl
gklI li,0[βhl (t)]
+
∑
j∈J
∑
l∈U˜j
J∑
i=1
gklI li,0βhl (t)
=−
1
V
ϕ˜2(t) +
∑
j∈J
∑
l∈U˜j
gklβhl (t).
APPENDIX D
DETAIL PROOF OF CLAIM 5
Proof: It is obvious that ∑J
j=1
∑
l∈U˜j∪U
k∗
j
,max
j
∑J
i=1 x
l
i(z) ·
νli =
∑J
j=1
∑
l∈U˜j∪U
k∗
j
,max
j
∑J
i=1 x̂
l
i · ν
l+
i . We
have ∑J
j=1
∑
l∈U˜j∪U
k∗
j
,max
j
∑J
i=1 x̂
l
i · ν
l+
i ≥ (1 −
δ)maxx∈P
∑J
j=1
∑
l∈U˜j∪U
k∗
j
,max
j
∑J
i=1 x
l
i · ν
l+
i since our
approximation algorithm verifies the integrality gap between
WDP and LPR, here P is the feasible region of the
LPR. (1 − δ)maxx∈P
∑J
j=1
∑
l∈U˜j∪U
k∗
j
,max
j
∑J
i=1 x
l
i · ν
l+
i ≥
(1− δ)maxx∈P
∑J
j=1
∑
l∈U˜j∪U
k∗
j
,max
j
∑J
i=1 x
l
i · ν
l
i as ν
l+
i ≥ ν
l
i .
Combining the above three relation, we can get the inequality
in Claim 5.
